Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’s Theory of Justice by Bae, Young-Soon
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
8-2002
Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’s Theory of
Justice
Young-Soon Bae
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bae, Young-Soon, "Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’s Theory of Justice. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2002.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2023
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Young-Soon Bae entitled "Balancing Equality and Liberty in
Rawls’s Theory of Justice." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content
and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts, with a major in Political Science.
Robert A. Gorman, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
David A. Reidy, Yang Zhong
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council: 
 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Young-Soon Bae entitled “Balancing 
Equality and Liberty in Rawls’s Theory of Justice.” I have examined the final 
electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements foe the degree of Master of 
Arts, with a major in Political Science. 
 
                                                                                                             
 
                                                     
                                                                                                                                             
Robert A. Gorman                               
Major Professor 
 
 
 
 
 
We have read this thesis and  
Recommend its acceptance: 
 
 
David A. Reidy   
 
Yang Zhong   
 
 
                                    
 
Acceptance for the Council: 
 
                                                                                        Anne Mayhew  
                                                                                        Vice Provost and  
                                                                                        Dean of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                      
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
 
 
BALANCING EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 
IN RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented for the 
Master of Arts 
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young-Soon Bae 
August 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
         There are many people to whom I am grateful for making my time at the 
University of Tennessee so rewarding. I would like to thank my thesis committee, 
David A. Reidy, and Yang Zhong. I would also like to thank the head of my 
committee, Robert A. Gorman, for all of his time and help. 
         There are other people whose assistance should be recognized. Huge thanks 
goes to Lydia Fanning for her help. I would like to thank Renee and Alison for 
their encouragement.  
         Lastly, the greatest thanks are owed to my parents. Without their help and 
support, I would never have reached this moment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
  
Abstract 
 
         This thesis examines the balance of equality and liberty in Rawls’s theory of 
justice. By analyzing the contents of his two principles of justice, this thesis 
supports his claim that the principles of justice adequately represent the values of 
equality and liberty.  
         The point that this thesis focuses on is the relationship between two 
principles of justice. According to Rawls, the relationship between them is created 
by priority rules. Rawls arranges two principles of justice in lexical order – the 
priority of the first principle over the second. This idea of priority rules does not 
provide an adequate standard to reconcile the values of equality and liberty 
because the priority rules emphasize liberty more than equality. 
         This results from Rawls’s position. That is, he attempts to compromise 
equality and liberty within a liberal’ view. Liberals do not have the intention to 
harmonize equality and liberty because the most important value for them is 
liberty. Thus, Rawls’s idea to balance equality and liberty has the same limit as 
liberals. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
         Since the collapse of most communist states, the international economy has 
a dominant order - capitalism. To put it concretely, the only way to participate in 
the international economy is to accept capitalism. If a state wants a stable 
economic situation, the state must adjust and follow the rules of capitalism. That 
is, they should guarantee the basic characteristics and principles of capitalism 
such as economic liberty and private property rights. Thus, it is not surprising that 
capitalism has been supported by classical liberalism, which guarantees free 
economic activity through the noninterference of a state or a government.  
         However, due to its characteristics such as the concentration of capital and 
the emphasis on economic liberty, capitalism has caused many social and 
economic problems such as a widening economic gap between haves and have-
nots. This has resulted in labor struggles as workers’ demand various rights such 
as the right of organization, the right to strike and the liberty of political activities. 
As a result, the social confrontation between capitalists and workers has 
intensified. Liberals recognized the need to accept the demand of workers in order 
to maintain peace and order, and at the same time, the challenge of socialists and 
communists, especially Marx, caused liberalism to begin to revise itself.  
         In order to solve severe economic and social inequality, liberals 
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reconsidered the equality of all of society and attempted to accept democracy. To 
include the idea of democracy in liberalism, most rights, which only the bourgeois 
class enjoyed, started to expand to all people as basic rights. This has been the 
evolution of liberalism from classical liberalism to reform liberalism, which I will 
hereafter refer that liberal democracy is the representative form of reform 
liberalism.  
         Liberal democracy permits political participation rights to the proletariat 
class and gives such rights as universal suffrage. In addition, liberal democracy 
allows a state to control the negative results of private ownership in order to 
consider the general interests of the low-income brackets. That is, its goal is to 
guarantee the minimum standard of living and impede the arrogance of 
monopolistic capital, within the framework of the welfare state.  
         Here, the important thing to note is that the premise of these goals is to 
guarantee individuals liberty, private property rights and freedom of economic 
activity as its first priority. This premise indicates that liberal democracy is the 
political ideology to guarantee capitalistic property rights like other forms of 
liberalism. Thus, granting that equality was expanded politically, there existed 
inequality economically because the bourgeois class had already accumulated and 
monopolized huge capital. As a result, there remains serious economic and social 
inequality in liberal democracy. To put it simply, liberal democracy is a mixture 
between economic inequality and political equality.  
 2
 
  
         Thus, the relationship between equality and liberty is that liberty still has 
much more weight than equality in liberalism. That is, while liberty has the 
absolute position as an unconditional right, equality has a relative position as a 
conditional right which can be shaken depending on the political and legal 
situation. Even though the efforts to alleviate social and economic inequality have 
been sustained through the state’s intervention and various policies, the general 
logic or principle that has controlled capitalist society is the absolute guarantee of 
economic liberty.  
         Yet, serious social and economic inequality and severe strains on liberal 
concepts of social justice reveal the limits of liberalism’s logical and theoretical 
ground. Therefore, as far as liberalism adheres to this logic, the revisions of 
liberalism have no meaning because the basic principle of the revisions is always 
the same even though the revisions include different means and attempts at 
reform. Thus, this continuous revision just indicates that liberalism is insufficient 
to correct its own limitation. The reason that liberalism has difficulty in correcting 
its limits and problems seems to be that liberals ignore or fail to find a persuasive 
compromise between liberty and equality. Even though liberalism is a theory that 
focuses on liberty, it is important to consider a compromise, because serious 
economic and social inequality can cause social unrest, conflict and disorder, so 
that even liberty cannot be guaranteed. Thus, the point that we should focus on is 
how to reconcile the conflict between the values of equality and liberty.  
 3
 
  
         Given this situation, it is not surprising that John Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice 1 has evoked huge response and attention. As Clark and Gintis point out, 
“Rawls’s work has provoked a level of response which may be taken as indicative 
of the seriousness of the dilemma [of liberalism].”2  
         As stated above, the core of the dilemma is the tension between liberty and 
equality. Rawls recognizes this fact and thus discusses equality, which most 
liberals have neglected or even suppressed. Rawls attempts an important 
theoretical work that addresses the value of equality, thereby expecting to create a 
theory of justice which can realize the values of equality and liberty. Thus, he 
even suggests that his theory – especially his two principles of justice – is 
“compatible with such different socio-economic systems as capitalism and 
socialism.”3 In other words, Rawls’s theory of justice appears to be the attempt to 
reconcile the confrontation of the ideological values of equality (socialism) and 
liberty (classical liberalism). However, this middle position confronts critiques 
from both socialists and liberals. 
         In spite of these critiques of Rawls’s attempt, it is worth discussing his idea 
because we seek a proper compromise between equality and liberty as a guide or 
solution to the problems of our current society. Thus, this paper seeks to explain 
and criticize Rawls’s theory of justice. Of course, I do not intend a comprehensive 
 
3 Daniels, Norman. Reading Rawls. New York: Basic Books, 1975. p. xiii. 
   
                                                 
1 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Page references   
   throughout the text are to this book. 
2 Clark, Barry & Gintis, Herbert. “Rawlsian Justice an Economic Systems,” Philosophy and  
Public  
  Affairs 7 (Summer, 1978). p. 303. 
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explanation of Rawls. Instead, I am centrally concerned with Rawlsian ideas 
about the attempt to resolve the two values of equality and liberty. My main 
interest is thus his ‘two principles of justice’.  
         According to Rawls, a conception of justice is appropriate for realizing in 
basic institutions the values of equality and liberty. Thus, his theory seeks to 
specify the values of equality and liberty within his theory of justice. Rawls 
maintains that his two principles of justice are the specific form that is capable of 
realizing equality and liberty. By analyzing the contents of his two principles of 
justice, this thesis supports his claim that the principles of justice adequately 
represent the values of equality and liberty.  
         After addressing the two principles of justice, Rawls explains the 
relationship between the two principles. The relationship between them is created 
by priority rules. According to the priority rules, Rawls arranges two principles of 
justice in lexical order – the priority of the first principle over the second. Because 
the priority rules establish the relationship between principles, they can provide 
the criteria of a balance between equality and liberty in Rawls’s theory. This 
thesis argues in various ways that Rawls’s idea of priority rules does not provide 
an adequate standard to reconcile the values of equality and liberty.  
         An additional aim of this paper is thus to clarify Rawls’s position between 
socialism and liberalism. I seek to demonstrate that he supports the basic ideas of 
liberalism through his essential features (the priority of the liberty principle over 
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the equality principle, “the institutional model of a property owning 
democracy”4).   
         In sum, my argument proceeds in three steps. First, after studying briefly 
general explanations of the notion and relationship between equality and liberty, I 
explain, in summary, the ‘original position’ that provides the philosophical 
foundation for his theory of justice. Here, I will explore how Rawls creates his 
principles of justice and justifies them by using his idea of ‘original position’. 
Next, I will concentrate on explaining and evaluating the contents of his 
principles of justice. I conclude that his two principles adequately represent the 
values of equality and liberty. Here, I also include some explanations of his 
modification of the ‘two principles of justice’ in his Political Liberalism. Third, I 
will explain and criticize his priority rules. Here, I will use the critiques by 
liberals and socialists. This approach seems to make sense because Rawls deals 
with the main values of each perspective. Through studying each field’s critique, I 
discover the limits of Rawls’s attempt to satisfy both values at once without 
making them limit each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
  259. 
   
                                                 
4 Doppelt, Gerald. “Rawls’ System of Justice: A critique from the Left,” Noûs 15 (Sep., 1981). p.  
6
II. The Notions of Equality and Liberty 
 
 
         When people mention equality or liberty, they say as follows: ‘All men have 
the right to be free’, ‘All men ought to be equal’. This indicates that these notions 
imply moral principles. This is different from other political concepts such as 
power or authority. That is, while the latter describes some features of human 
relationship, the former is a prescriptive term as well as a descriptive term. Thus, 
equality and liberty are regarded as ideals or principles: “something men aim at or 
by reference to which they guide their conduct.”5  
         This view that equality and liberty are moral principles commonly assumes 
that “liberty and equality are sufficiently justified by refuting the arguments used 
against them. [Thus,] the burden of proof is always on the enemy.”6 That is, we 
might suppose that when people talk about these notions, we consider “some 
closely related evaluation concept, such as impartiality or justice.”7 For instance, 
just as the situation of coercion can highlight the need of liberty as a moral 
principle, the situation of inequality can indicate the significance of equality. In 
other words, these notions are a response to the moral claims of individuals, so 
that they make it possible to assess “arguments for or against certain practices 
 
7 Wilson, John. Equality. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966. p. 19. 
   
                                                 
5 Rees, John. Equality. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. p. 11. 
6 Graham, A.C. “Liberty and Equality,” Mind. 74 (Jan., 1965). p. 59. 
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which are justified by reference to those concepts.”8 In sum, the notions of 
equality and liberty are interpreted as moral principles in this thesis.  
         Even with a clear view of this definition, some ambiguity remains because 
they are complicated concepts connecting the various fields of society, not simple 
concepts limited to one or another field of society. That is, they are “concept[s] of 
which there are many conceptions.” 9 As Waldron says of equality, “men appeal 
to [them] in a host of contexts – moral, political, legal, economic, religious, 
educational and social.”10 The same is true of liberty. Thus, these concepts have 
suffered much confusion. In order to avoid this confusion, I briefly explain 
arguments about these conceptual and linguistic questions below. 
         First, in order to avoid conceptual confusion, I use the words liberty and 
freedom to mean the same.11 Of course, there are other views such as Hannah 
Arendt’s.12 However, the purpose of this thesis is not deep arguments of 
conceptual or linguistic problems. In addition, because this thesis focuses on 
moral values or aspects of liberty, the distinction between liberty and freedom is 
 
    concerns.  
   
                                                 
8 Blackstone, William T. The Concept of Equality. Minnesota: Burgess Publishing Company,  
  1969. p. v. 
9 Waldron, Jeremy.  “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” Philosophical Quarterly. 37  
   (Apr., 1987). p.130. 
10 Blackstone, William T. p. v. 
11 Isaiah Berlin, in his famous essay on liberty, states that he will use both words to mean the   
    same.  See Berlin, Isaiah.  “Two concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty.  Oxford:  
    Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 121. 
12 Hannah Arendt considers this conceptual difference central to her most urgent theoretical  
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not necessary. Thus, I follow Maurice Cranston’s conclusion that, “in English 
usage of the words ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ are virtually interchangeable.”13  
         Second, this thesis does not distinguish the kinds or meaning of freedom. 
This assumption departs from Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”. 
He divides freedom into negative and positive freedom. He defined negative 
liberty as freedom from coercion while positive liberty means autonomy, that is, 
“the power of self-direction.”14 However, there is no significant meaning for this 
thesis to distinguish between negative and positive liberty because, here, the 
concept of liberty is interpreted as a moral concept. That is, liberty responds to 
people’s moral claims of autonomy as well as freedom from coercion. In addition, 
it seems that “the distinction between negative and positive liberty is not so 
sharp”15 because both concepts of liberty share “a common ground, [that is] self-
determination.”16 Thus, this thesis deals with both meanings without distinction. 
         Third, this thesis does not attempt the explanation of the various kinds of 
equality because the concept of equality in this thesis means not only the different 
kinds of equality but also the comprehensive concept as a value concerned with 
the various aspects of human good. 
         The clarification of these concepts is for avoiding confusion when I use 
these terms, not for entering the controversy of linguistic questions. I just want to 
limit the scope of terms in order to prevent confusion. Again, I assume simply that 
                                                 
13 Cranston, Maurice.  Freedom. New York: Basic Books, 1967. p. 32. 
14 Merquior, J.G.  Liberalism: Old and New. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991. p. 8. 
15 Ibid., p. 9. 
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16 Ibid. 
these notions of equality and liberty are “a moral conception worked out for a 
specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social and economic institutions.”17 
To put it simply, these notions as necessary rules of human conduct might be 
relevant in explaining some features of society. This is “to urge that both equality 
and liberty are necessary elements in the conception of a humane society.”18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. p. 11. 
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18 Rees, John. p. 106. 
III. Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
 
Two Principles of Justice 
 
The Original Position and Justification 
         As assumed above, equality and liberty are moral conceptions. For Rawls, 
“a political conception of justice is [also] a moral conception.” 19 We can say, 
therefore, that the values of equality and liberty and the political conception of 
justice belong to the same category. That is, they are not a separated relationship 
but a relationship of supportive influences on the other. Thus, Rawls seeks to 
realize the values of equality and liberty in his theory of justice. 
         However, as Rawls points out, “a deep disagreement exists as to how the 
values of liberty and equality are best realized in the basic structure of society.”20 
Due to this argument, there is a tendency to think that it is useless to discuss a 
compromise between equality and liberty and difficult to create a joint principle 
expressing these values. 
         Yet, as Rawls addresses,  “one task of political philosophy is to focus on 
such questions and to examine…a mutually acceptable way of resolving these 
questions publicly established.”21 Thus, unlike other liberals, he regards the 
                                                 
19 Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985),” In Samuel Freeman  
    (Ed.), Collected Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 389. 
20 Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” p. 391. 
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21 Ibid., p. 408. 
tension between equality and liberty as the main cause of the crisis of modern 
society and thus attempts a proper compromise to solve the controversy. To 
resolve the tension between equality and liberty, Rawls proposes two principles of 
justice. That is, Rawls creates two principles of justice “as guidelines for how 
basic institutions are to realize the values of liberty and equality.”22  
         To create principles of justice, Rawls presents ‘justice as fairness’. For 
Rawls, when fairness is guaranteed, people can agree to the principles of justice. 
Thus, he conveys the idea that “the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial 
situation that is fair” (11). Rawls calls an initial situation the ‘original position’.  
         For Rawls, the conditions that people have in the basic structure of society 
are very different, and these differences can have a profound influence from the 
start. To put it specifically, the starting point of some people is better than others 
due to different economic and social conditions, and therefore this can become the 
cause of deep inequality. Yet, “[the inequality] cannot possibly be justified by an 
appeal to the notions of merit or desert” (7). Therefore, we need a fair and equal 
starting point. That is why we need social justice derived from a fair and equal 
situation.  
         To do this, Rawls devises the original position as “purely hypothetical”(19, 
104). According to Rawls’s assumption, people create a contract (or principles) in 
the original position, just as social contract theorists assume that people agree to a 
contract in the ‘state of nature’. Rawls also agrees with the Kant’s assumption of 
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22 Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. p. 5. 
people’s nature. “Kant held, I [Rawls] believe[s], that a person is acting 
autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most 
adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being” 
(222). In other words, in the original position, each person is assumed to be 
rational, and so is assumed to seek to maximize his well-being, that is, self-
interested. Thus, “such a person would choose those principles which would 
maximize his expected benefits.”23 Thus, they each have fundamental aims and 
interests, and they each have a right to equal respect and consideration in 
determining the principles. They also have “a sense of justice that normally 
governs their conduct” (475). That is, “they are capable of having a conception of 
their good” (505). Thus, we can say that in the original position people who have 
equal status can create the principles by which the basic structure of their society 
is to be governed.  
         How, or more specifically, by which process do they create and agree on the 
principle? As stated above, Rawls’s principle of justice is justice as fairness. That 
is, people need a fair situation during the process of creating principles. Thus, the 
original position presupposes some conditions which all people, who participate 
in a contract, can accept. The conditions that Rawls suggests are ‘the veil of 
ignorance’ and ‘mutual indifference’.  
 
     Theory of Justice. New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1999. p. 211. 
   
                                                 
23 Gauthier, David. “Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls’ Ideological  
     Framework,” In Henry S. Richardson (Ed.), Development and Main Outlines of Rawls’s  
13
         The veil of ignorance means that people do not know their interest and the 
particular contents of their perspective. That is, they have no information about 
their place in society (class position, social status), their natural assets 
(intelligence, strength), their own conception of the good (plans, values), their 
particular psychological attributes (attitudes toward risk, optimism), or about the 
particular aspects of their own society (its political or economic system, history 
and so on) (118-119). Such a veil of ignorance prevents people from agreeing to a 
contract according to their interests. 
         This condition, i.e., a veil of ignorance, is obviously to represent equality 
between human beings since people do not know their particular circumstances. 
In other words, because they do not know which piece of the pie they have, they 
divide it equally. If you know some particular facts, how is it possible to maintain 
a fair situation and distribute the pie evenly? For example, if one of the parties 
knows who the other party is, it is difficult to reach a fair contract because the 
contents of the contract can be changed according to whether the other people are 
enemies or friends. To avoid this situation, Rawls presupposes ‘mutual 
indifference’. This is for preventing people from being influenced by other people 
when they create a contract. By these conditions, for Rawls, people have a fair 
circumstance that is capable of creating a contract in the original position.          
         However, the veil of ignorance does not mean that they are totally in 
ignorance like people in the state of nature in Rousseau’s theory. They are not in 
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ignorance like people in a state of nature even though people have no particular 
information in the original position. Here, Rawls suggests the other idea to 
explain the original position – ‘the circumstance of justice’. Rawls calls the 
situation that requires justice the circumstance of justice. For Rawls, society is 
typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests. The 
circumstance of justice is “the condition of moderate scarcity (among the 
objective circumstances), and that of conflict of interests (among the subjective 
circumstances)” (110). These conditions of the circumstance of justice require 
justice. In other words, because all resources are limited and most parties want the 
limited resources, conflict among people or groups occurs and people discover the 
need for a set of principles of justice in order to solve the conflict.  
         Which selection is possible in the original position? In the original position, 
people are in a very insecure situation because they have no specific information 
about themselves. Thus, people tend to avoid the risk and try to secure “their 
unknown but particular interests from the original position” (475). To do this, 
they attempt to negotiate to choose the principles of justice. In other words, since 
people know that all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles 
to favor his particular condition behind a veil of ignorance, it is possible to 
mediate to create fair principles among people. Thus, we can say that “the 
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” (11).  
Concretely, “the parties would therefore find it rational to opt for a system of 
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equal distribution of all social primary goods24 except where the inequalities lead 
to the maximization of the long-term expectation of the worst of least well off 
group in society.”25 
         In sum, the original position seems to be able to provide the appropriate 
condition to create the principles of justice. In other words, as Rawls intends, the 
original position can ensure fairness of process. First, in the original position, “the 
participants are symmetrically situated and subject to the veil of ignorance.”26 
Moreover, the original position is specified to embody the appropriate reciprocity 
and equality between persons. Thus, people require a set of principles, which 
constitutes social justice in the original position. Lastly, since people are rational 
and self-interested in the original position according to Rawls’s assumption, they 
seem to be able to make a reasonable, objective, relatively secure decision about 
principles of justice even though the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil 
of ignorance.  
 
First Principle (Liberty Principle) 
         How do Rawls’s principles represent and specify the values of equality and 
liberty? To seek an answer, I will explore the contents of two principles of justice.          
 
    (1974): 633-55 p. 638. 
   
                                                 
24 Primary goods are goods that any rational person is presumed to want whatever else he wants.  
    Rawls explains two primary goods: social primary goods (rights, liberties, opportunities, the  
    social basis of self-respect and income and wealth) and natural primary goods or natural assets  
    (health and vigor, intelligence and imagination) (54). 
25 Haksar, Vinit. Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. p.  
    164. 
26 Rawls, John. “Reply to Alexander and Musgrave,” Quarterly Journal of Economic 88  
16
         Rawls presupposes that the social structure may be divided into having two 
more or less distinct parts. That is why “he distinguishes between the aspects of 
the social system that define and secure the equal basic liberties and the aspects 
that specify and establish social and economic inequalities” (53) when he creates 
the principle of justice. Thus, he proposes two principles. His two principles 
respectively represent liberty and equality. He applies them to the basic structure 
of society in the social and economic spheres. 
         Rawls’s first principle of justice is that “each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others” (53). This simply means that the basic 
liberties should be equal for all. That is, Rawls addresses liberty in his first 
principle. 
         How does Rawls realize liberty in the first principle?  
         According to his first principle, liberty is specified as basic liberties. Here, 
there is one question. What are basic liberties? Rawls states that he does not try to 
propose a general theory of justice. In the same way, basic liberties do not mean a 
general concept of liberty but refer only to specific kinds of liberty. Thus, he 
focuses on particular liberties not a general concept of liberty. “The basic liberties 
to which Rawls’ principle thus refers are identified by the parties as essential for 
the pursuit of their ends, whatever those ends turn out to be, and so as determining 
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the form of their society.”27 That is why he uses the plural of ‘liberty’. To clarify 
basic liberties, Rawls provides a list of basic liberties. These are political liberty 
(the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) and freedom of speech and 
assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person; 
the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure 
as defined by the concept of the rule of law (53).  
         “The list is made up of two kinds of things: liberties in the strict sense and 
the avoidance of certain injuries at the hands of others.”28 Yet, when Rawls talks 
of basic liberties, he uses both kinds without distinction. Thus, we can see a 
certain common point here; “they can both be individuated and be said to hold 
without qualification for all people”.29 That is, basic liberties that Rawls suggests 
tend to relate to the private matters not the public matters. To put it specifically, 
for Rawls, an individual’s free choices should be respected insofar as these 
choices are consistent with the demands of justice. “In this sense the 
autonomously chosen goods of rational moral agents have a kind of prima facie 
validity. Other people must respect them. Wants are, in this sense, private 
matters.”30 Thus, Rawls simply lists, without argument, the right to hold personal 
property, but not property in the means of production, as one of the basic liberties 
 
    1989. p. 38.  
   
                                                 
27 Hart, H.L.A. “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority,” In Norman Daniels (Ed.), Reading Rawls.  
    New York: Basic Books, 1975. p. 235. 
28 Martin, Rex. Rawls and Rights. Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1985. p. 47. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Strike, Kenneth A.  Liberal Justice and the Marxist Critique of Education. New York: 
Routledge,  
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(61) because Rawls regards personal property as belonging to the individual 
sphere.  
         This results from the natural characteristic of persons in the original 
position. To put it concretely, for Rawls, the parties who choose basic liberties 
and noninjuries are themselves free and equal. In the original position, they do not 
know the group that they belong to. They just exist as rational, moral and self-
interested individuals. Thus, Rawls focuses on basic liberties that can satisfy each 
person’s interests and equal and free status. 
         There is another question. As stated in the first principle, people require the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties. Does this mean unlimited 
liberty or limited liberty? Are basic liberties able to be restricted? 
         According to his principle, a basic liberty can be restricted for one if it is 
restricted for everyone. This means that when a basic liberty is restricted, it must 
be restricted equally for all. If basic liberties apply to only a particular class, the 
principle is violated. Thus, the goal of the first principle is not absolute liberty but 
equal liberty. For this, we need rules that can restrict absolute liberty and ensure 
equal liberty. Rawls suggests especially the constitutional process as the proper 
standard to restrict liberty, because  “the constitutional process should preserve 
the equal representation of the original position to the degree that this is 
practicable”(195). Thus, a restriction by rules such as constitution is not to restrict 
liberty but to ensure liberty by regulation. That is why Rawls discusses “liberty in 
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connection with constitutional and legal restrictions” (177). In these cases liberty 
is a certain structure of institution, a certain system of public rules defining rights 
and duties. Thus, basic political liberty can be restricted (“on the grounds 
restriction will lead to just legislation”31) under the condition that such legislation 
ensures equal liberty. The guarantee of liberty by constitution seems to be 
convincing as a means to guarantee liberty. At least, this indicates that liberty is 
an important element to establish the framework of the basic structure of society.  
         However, there is a problem in interpreting the condition to restrict liberty. 
The condition that Rawls provides is as follows: “liberty is only to be restricted 
for the sake of liberty itself” (250, 302). This means that liberty is restricted in 
two cases: when basic liberties are and can be threatened and when the restriction 
can promote a greater system of basic liberties (203, 229). Yet, “how could one 
assert that an allowed inequality in a given basic liberty could be the means to a 
greater system of equal basic liberties for all persons?”32 
         Rawls gives a number of examples which his principle would permit. The 
simplest case is the introduction of rules of order in debate (203) which restrict 
the liberty to speak when we please. This is not to restrict the content of speech 
but to regulate the order of speech in order to guarantee a greater liberty. In this 
very simple case “there seems to be a quite obvious answer to the question.”33  
 
 
   
                                                 
31 Pogge, Thomas. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. p. 159. 
32 Martin Rex. p. 57. 
33 Hart, H.L.A. p. 239. 
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         However, Mill’s example that Rawls provides is controversial. According to 
Mill, one person/one vote may not be best. Rather, plural voting that some people, 
who belong to particular parties such as college graduate, have more than one 
vote can accord with the natural order of human life because people who are wiser 
or educated can make a better decision. In addition, plural voting can encourage 
other people to go college and thus obtain better opportunity (or liberty) because 
they will want equal liberty (plural voting) that college graduates enjoy. If so, 
plural voting can improve other people’s liberty. Thus, their judgment should 
have a superior weight. However, can political liberty be restricted for a better 
decision or for a greater liberty? For Rawls, “we are to ask which adjustment it 
would be rational for him [the representative equal citizen] to prefer” (179).  
         However, as Hart claims, “I do not understand, except in the very simple 
cases, what sort of argument is to be used to show what the representative’s 
rational preference would be and in what sense it results in ‘a greater liberty’.”34 
Moreover, “many of the most important judgments are made under conditions 
where it is not to be expected that conscientious persons with full powers of 
reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclusion.”35 Thus, 
Rawls modifies some part of the liberty principle: from ‘the most extensive total 
system’ that Rawls suggests in A Theory of Justice to ‘a fully adequate scheme’ in 
Political Liberalism. This is the result of accepting Hart’s critique that the most 
equal liberty may not be the most extensive liberty. According to Hart, because 
                                                 
34 Ibid., pp. 242-43 
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basic liberties can be incompatible with each other, some cases of mediation 
among basic liberties can happen. For example, free discussion without rules can 
mean more extensive liberty because when most people want to speak, they can 
speak. But, it also means that they, in fact, do not enjoy their liberty extensively 
because they cannot communicate their opinion effectively. That is, their intention 
(or liberty) to communicate their opinion is limited. Thus, Rawls revises his first 
principle in Political Liberalism as follows:  
 
“Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only 
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.”36  
 
 
This revision suggests ‘fair value’ which is “measures assuring to all citizens 
adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and 
opportunities.”37 This means that the revision demands that people receive fair 
value for equal political liberties and thus it seems to be reasonable, because to 
secure fair value for equal political liberties can guarantee liberty more properly 
and effectively. Rawls maintains that this can cover “citizen’s basic needs as 
constitutional essentials,”38 so that liberty can be realized in the constitutional 
stage. Thus, this modification addresses a more practical and proper 
representation of liberty. 
                                                 
36 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 271, 291. 
37 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Second Principle (Equality Principle) 
         The second principle starts from the fact that there can exist inequality even 
in free society. That is, it is impossible to distribute social and economic goods to 
everyone equally. However, this inequality should be restricted unless the 
inequality is justifiable. Thus, the next question is, which principle is needed in 
order to justify inequality? According to Rawls, the case that inequality is 
justified is that all people obtain a favorable result by the inequality. Here, for 
Rawls, because people are behind the veil of ignorance, the way that all people 
choose to obtain a satisfactory result is that the least advantaged obtain the most 
benefit. Second, in an unequal distribution situation, good positions or 
opportunities should be opened to all people. Rawls sums up these ideas in his 
second principle.  
 
 Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with 
the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open 
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (266). 
 
As stated above, the second principle is the principle about economic and social 
inequality. This principle, thus, requires a response about economic and social 
inequality. Thus, this is interpreted as the equality principle.   
         Here, the meaning of equality is not simply to divide a pie into the same size 
pieces but to distribute it reasonably. Thus, some inequalities may be inevitable 
and useful. So, granting that inequality in position is both inevitable and useful, 
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“each would want those positions to be open to all on some principle of equitable 
competition or fair play.”39 This means the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. This is a part of the second principle of justice. 
         The opportunities mentioned here are economic opportunities because 
Rawls clarifies that the second principle focuses on economic and social 
inequality. Thus, concretely, the idea of fair equality of opportunity refers to 
opportunities to hold positions that generate income and wealth. In addition, “we 
speak here of reasonable equality of opportunity”40 because the parties do not 
want to act in an unreasonable or indefensible way. Therefore, “they concur in the 
stipulation that the wealth-generating positions be open to all [by] some 
reasonable principle of equality of opportunity.”41   
         Which principle is a reasonable principle of equality of opportunity? For 
Rawls, it rests on the interpretation of this principle.  
         The first interpretation is the view of the system of natural liberty. 
According to this view, the principle of fair equality of opportunity means that 
“positions are open to those able and willing to strive for them [and] will lead to a 
just distribution” (57). As a result, in the system of natural liberty, people, who 
participate in free competition, can gain a position by using their social 
connections. That is, the system of natural liberty regards the distribution of 
                                                 
39 Martin, Rex. p. 67. 
36 Ibid., p. 66. 
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income and wealth as the cumulative effects of natural and social contingencies. 
Thus, it is not surprising that people end up unequal under this system.  
         The second interpretation is the liberal equality perspective. It tries to 
correct the problem of the system of natural liberty by adding to the requirement 
of ‘careers open to talents’ the further condition of the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. “The thought here is that positions are to be not only open in a 
formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them. That is, we 
might say that those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life 
chances” (63). In other words, people with the same talents should have equal and 
fair opportunity regardless of social circumstance. 
         But, the liberal equality conception still has limits to solve inequality by 
natural contingencies. It regards natural contingencies as the outcome of the 
natural lottery or luck. Thus, the distribution of natural assets is a fact of nature, 
and no attempt is made to change it or even to take it into account. That is, this 
view excludes the distribution of opportunity by social contingency but still 
permits the distribution of income and wealth determined by natural 
contingencies. Finally, both interpretations cannot guarantee the values of 
equality. 
         The main problem of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is how to 
solve inequality by natural endowment. Natural endowment, in reality, has a 
significant impact on the subsequent holding of positions. If one is born with a 
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strong background such as a wealthy family, intelligence and strength, one has 
absolute advantages over people who do not have the same background. This 
reality has strengthened inequality between haves and have-nots. Thus, it is not 
easy to find a person who has a higher social position with a disadvantageous 
background while it is easy to find a person who succeeds with a strong 
background. We can see that natural endowments obstruct equal opportunity for 
all. Moreover, Rawls claims that such contingencies are “arbitrary from a moral 
perspective” (64). Thus, Rawls maintains that inequality by arbitrariness of 
fortune or accident should be somehow compensated.  
         We cannot say that natural endowment is an individuals’ fault or credit. No 
one can choose or change his/her natural endowment. That is a fact of nature. 
Thus, “no individual could be said to be responsible for having the natural 
endowment that he has or he has not.”42 However, simultaneously, “no one could 
be said to deserve that endowment; its possession is unmerited”.43   
         If so, how do we solve inequality determined by natural endowment?         
First, Rawls rejects the principle of liberal equality as well as the principle of the 
natural system. Then, Rawls offers the third approach, what he calls democratic 
equality. The point of this approach is to reduce the gap in advantages by their 
genetic endowment. However, in reality, the principle of opportunity cannot be 
completely realized as long as the family institution exists. Thus, we need another 
principle that can ensure equality and enhance the opportunities of those with the 
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lesser opportunity. That is why Rawls proposes the other element – the difference 
principle - of his second principle. 
 
         The difference principle is also the principle for the social and economic 
sphere. It represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural 
talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever 
it turns out to be. That is, the difference principle can be a general guide for 
redistributing offices related to wealth and income. “In this way, the difference 
principle acknowledges the arbitrariness of fortune by asserting that I am not 
really the owner but merely the guardian or repository of the talents and capacities 
that happen to reside in me, and as such have no special moral claim on the fruits 
of their exercise.”44 That is, the difference principle governs the distribution of 
“offices and positions of responsibility; income and wealth and the social bases of 
self-respect.”45 
        As formulated by Rawls, the difference principle states that social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit to 
the least advantaged. Even though this principle permits inequality, why do 
people choose this principle?  
         This can be interpreted as follows: because of the veil of ignorance, agents 
cannot know their position. However, they want to guarantee their interests even 
                                                 
44 Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University    
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when they belong to the least advantaged. Thus, agents cannot help selecting the 
principle that the benefits to the least advantaged are indeed maximized. The best 
way to prevent the worst scenario is to allow inequalities by the difference 
principle. Under this uncertain situation, “the maximin is an insurance policy”46 
because maximin rules tell us to rank alternatives by their worst possible 
outcomes. “We are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior 
to the worst outcome of others” (133). That is why people ought to prefer the 
distributive principle that the least advantaged obtain the greatest benefit 
according to maximin strategy that the worst result becomes the safest choice. 
This means that participants choose the principle of justice with the perspective of 
the least advantaged person. To consider the particular parties is an unfair 
condition, but if some inequality can improve people’s situation more than simply 
equality, rational people definitely choose the inequality. 
         Here, there is one question about the difference principle. It appears to make 
sense that the least well-off accept the difference principle because the principle 
guarantees their best benefit. What is the reason that people who have better 
conditions accept the difference principle? Rawls’s answer is as follows: “by 
accepting the difference principle, they view the greater abilities as a social asset 
to be used for the common advantage. But it is also in the interest of each to have 
greater natural assets” (92). That is, the difference principle expresses a 
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conception of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Thus, Rawls claims with firm 
confidence that the difference principle can realize equality.  
         Furthermore, “Rawls says, a conception of justice should publicly express 
men’s respect for one another; in this way they ensure a sense of their own 
value.”47 The public recognition of the two principles gives greater support to 
men’s self-respect and this increases the effectiveness of social cooperation. Both 
effects are strong reasons for agreeing to these principles. Finally, people can be 
guaranteed liberty and equality and can reach justice by choosing the safest 
principle. Because they are rational and selfish, they select the safest choice i.e., 
the principle of justice, especially the difference principle. Rawls argues that these 
principles of justice “not only protect individuals’ basic rights but insure against 
the worst eventualities” (154).  
         In sum, Rawls develops the two principles of justice by “distinction between 
the distributive or equality-related and the liberty-related aspects of the theory.”48 
That is, each of these principles applies to a different part of the basic structure; 
and both are properly concerned not only with liberty (with basic rights, liberties, 
and opportunities), but also with the claims of equality.   
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Priority Rules 
The Content of the Priority Rules 
         However, in reality, each sphere does not exist either separately or 
independently. Thus, we should consider both spheres when we deal with the 
relationship between equality and liberty.  
         From a common sense perspective, it seems difficult to reach the values of 
equality and liberty at the same time, because people think that “the principles of 
equality and liberty are as much opposed to each other as they require each 
other.”49 That is, these notions are regarded to have incompatible characteristics. 
In fact, “when the version of equality under discussion requires equalization of 
outcomes, it is easy to see how the two ideals might conflict.”50 To put it 
specifically, equality tends to make up for individuals’ deficiencies with outside 
help. Libertarians claim that this characteristic impedes the exercise of liberty. 
Certainly, from the liberal perspective, equality necessarily conflicts with liberty; 
“for when goods and services of various types – legal, economic, educational and 
social – are distributed to all human beings in a society according to certain 
criteria, this definitely prevents some individuals from doing what they want to 
do.”51  
                                                 
49 Charvet, John. A Critique of Freedom and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
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         However, these concepts are not as simple as liberals assume. “Liberty is 
not taken to mean simply freedom to do whatever one wants to do, just as equality 
as an ideal is not taken to mean simply a total leveling or uniformity of treatment 
of humans.”52 Thus, we cannot simply say that equality and liberty are 
incompatible or irreconcilable even though they are often in tension. Moreover, 
equality and liberty are the values that correspond to individuals’ claims about 
some problems, for example, coercion and inequality. To solve these problems, 
that is, to answer the demand of individuals’ claims, we should consider the 
values of equality and liberty simultaneously. 
         Thus, the next point is how Rawls controls the relationship between his two 
principles that represent the values of equality and liberty respectively. That is, 
how does Rawls reconcile the values of equality and liberty i.e., the first principle 
and the second principle? As introduced above, this is a very important question 
in the present society because this question, that is, the tension between equality 
and liberty, is the main reason for the crisis of modern society according to Rawls. 
         Rawls compromises these principles by priority rules. This priority rule is 
Rawls’s criterion to balance the two values. Rawls seems to assume that the 
principles have a ranking. Thus, he assigns these principles in a serial order with 
the first principle prior to the second. Rawls restates the two principle of justice as 
rules of priority:  
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First priority rule (the priority of liberty) is that the principles of justice 
are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty.  
 
Second priority rule (the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare) 
is that the second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of 
efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair 
opportunity is prior to the difference principle (302-303).  
 
Here, there are two lexical orders. One is the priority principle between the first 
principle and the second principle. The other is the priority principle between the 
opportunity principle and the difference principle. This can be formulated as 
follows. The first principle > The principle of fair equality of opportunity > The 
difference principle. This means that the matter of protecting the first principle 
(liberty principle) takes priority over and is more urgent than the matter of 
guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity or that of “ensuring that social and 
economic inequalities work to the net advantage of those who are least 
advantaged by those inequalities.”53 Thus, we can say that basic liberties have an 
absolute weight in regard to other values. That is, “liberty is to be given priority 
over other primary social goods.”54  
         Let us consider the first part. The first priority rule is the priority of liberty. 
This means that the first principle should be fully complied with before the 
second principle is considered. As discussed above, the second principle is about 
equality of income and wealth. Therefore, this priority rule means that the matter 
of liberty takes priority over the matter of wealth and income. In other words, 
 
    Reading Rawls. p. 264. 
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“infringements of the basic equal liberties protected by the first principle cannot 
be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages” (53-
54). Thus, the parties will not exchange a lesser liberty for an improved income. 
“It should suffice to note his consistent adherence to the inviolability of liberty.”55  
         Why does liberty takes priority over equality? According to Rawls, liberty 
protects that which is of fundamental importance to human beings. For Rawls’s 
example, “the basis for self-esteem in a just society is not one’s income share but 
the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties” (544-45). 
Thus, the right to liberty is not among the gains of social cooperation, but the 
necessary condition of it. 
         Next, the second priority rule establishes that the opportunity principle 
comes before the difference principle. This means that “the basic institutions of a 
society must be arranged that conditions providing for fair equality of opportunity 
are met as fully as possible before the difference principle comes into play.”56 
That is, the difference principle applies within a framework that is structured by 
the first principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Thus, the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity is emphasized as a key element of 
building the economic constitution of any just society. Finally, by choosing this 
order of priority, Rawls, in reality, relegates the realization of equality to the last 
order. 
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The Limits of the Priority Rules 
         Rawls claims that the two principles by priority rules can reconcile equality 
and liberty. Now, I evaluate his claim that his two principles of justice by priority 
rules succeed in harmonizing equality and liberty. This discussion is not whether 
liberty has the ground to have priority position but whether or not a priority rule is 
the proper criteria to balance equality and liberty. Here, the noticeable thing is 
that the meaning of ‘balance’ or ’compromise’ between equality and liberty is not 
that the two values are realized at the same time with the same weight but that the 
two values are realized without limiting each other. 
         Rawls suggests the constitutional process to explain the ground of priority 
rules because “the history of successful constitutions indicates the wisdom of this 
pattern [i.e., the priority rules].”57 Thus, Rawls discusses his principles in the 
constitutional process. He proposes four stages that the two principles apply to – 
the original position, the constitutional stage, the legislative stage, and the stage of 
application of rules (171-175). The two principles are derived from the original 
position. And then, they are applied according to the order of each stage. The 
constitutional stage is a stage to establish the constitution by principles of justice 
selected in the original position. This has the most important meaning because the 
constitution is interpreted as the inviolable standard to establish the specific form 
of justice. That is, the constitution becomes the core reference to establish the 
framework of a society. Thus, “the constitution has direct influence to the 
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behavior of legislators and administrators and judges.”58 People want these 
governmental agents to realize and promote the values of the constitution.  
         Here, Rawls includes the first principle (liberty principle) in the 
constitutional stage. This means that liberty is guaranteed by the constitution. 
Liberty is understood as inviolable rights in the construction of the constitution of 
a just society. On the other hand, he excludes the second principle (equality 
principle) from the constitutional stage. Rather, the second principle is applied at 
the legislative stage because “the second principle of justice … is not incorporated 
into the constitution itself” (199).  
         This distinction is explained concretely in Political Liberalism. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls’s principles of justice consist of the ‘constitutional essential’ 
and ‘matters of basic justice’. The reason that Rawls suggests this distinction is 
that the two principles have different roles in the basic structure of society. 
Moreover, Rawls states additional reasons: “it is more urgent to settle the 
essentials dealing with the basic freedoms. It is far easier to tell whether those 
essentials are realized. It is much easier to gain agreement about what the basic 
rights and liberties should be not in every detail of course, but about the main 
outlines.”59 In these reasons, Rawls excludes the second principle from the 
constitutional essentials. That is, the second principle concerns the matters of 
basic justice and is applied in the legislative stage. It seems reasonable that the 
second principle (economic matters) is not the concern of the constitution because 
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economic matters take extended time to identify and seek solutions. However, the 
constitution does not have only a practical meaning. It can provide the most 
important reference and framework of society and thus it should include the basic 
direction or idea about economic structure, which is one part of society. 
Moreover, with the additional question, why is the first principle a more urgent 
matter, and why does the principle that people agree with easily take priority?  
         Without a concrete explanation, Rawls just claims that successful 
constitutions can provide some principles to regulate economic and social 
inequalities. In fact, unlike Rawls’s claim, “historical evidence indicates that 
those who control the means of production have an inordinate influence in the 
[constitutional process],”60 and thus it is difficult to expect that the powerful class 
will guarantee the equality principle in the legislative stage. In addition, under 
Rawls’s claim that the second principle is excluded from the constitutional stage, 
when the second principle conflicts with the first principle, people will follow the 
first principle because, for Rawls, the first principle is applied in a prior stage than 
the second principle. That is, the second principle (equality principle) is realized 
within the framework created by the first principle (liberty principle). The 
realization of equality is possible within the scope of the first principle. If the 
demand about equality is incompatible with liberty, the structure or system 
created by the liberty principle will not permit the demand. This is not a real 
balance between equality and liberty. Rather, this shows the limits of Rawls’s 
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compromise. That is, this compromise (two principles by priority rules) has limits 
to solve the tension between equality and liberty. 
         First, Rawls claims that the lexical order can be derived from the original 
position. People tend to avoid the worst situation in the original position, so that 
they want to have at least the basic rights (liberties). Thus, the first principle 
(liberty principle) has the first order. In addition, in any situation, people should 
have hope for the future. To do this, people should have the opportunities that 
they want. Thus, the principle of equal opportunity is the second and the 
difference principle has the last order.  
         However, this claim is not realistic. In the worst situation, do people really 
demand the liberty principle such as the liberty of speech or the rights of political 
participation? In fact, to choose the difference principle makes more sense 
because the difference principle makes the worst situation become the favorable 
result. If people are rational like Rawls’s assumption, it is likely for them to 
choose the favorable result rather than the liberty principle. Thus, Rawls’s claim 
that the priority rules can be explained in the original position is invalid.   
         Second, due to the emphasis on liberty, Rawls’s compromise has the 
tendency to ignore the matter of economic inequality. This limits the equality 
principle, so that the priority rule is not the proper standard for balancing equality 
and liberty. However, according to Rawls, the priority rule does not limit equality 
as well as liberty. To put it concretely, for Rawls, if the material means, which 
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have good quality, are fully available, “[people’s] interest in liberty grow 
stronger, and [their interest] of further economic and social advantage 
decreases.”61 However, even though people can increase material means, people 
have no intention or need to give up their economic interests and social status 
because people are selfish according to Rawls’s assumption. Especially, under a 
capitalist society that shares the same assumption that people are self-interested, 
people want further economic and social advantage because capitalism is a system 
to concentrate on infinite capital. Thus, we need to consider economic regimes. 
         Yet, Rawls avoids the evaluation of economic institutions that are directly 
related to economic inequality. He maintains that the choice of economic 
institution depends upon each country’s “circumstances, institutions, and 
historical traditions” (208). Thus, Rawls claims that the point that we have to 
concentrate on in the discussion of the economic arrangement of a just society is 
“which[,] either a private-property economy or a socialist regime[,] can satisfy 
this conception of justice” (272). 
         However, in fact, Rawls’s position about economic institutions is not 
neutral. First, he, as stated above, follows the assumption of a liberal capitalist: 
people are self-interested and rational. This is “a central theme of liberal 
theories.”62 In order to guarantee their interest, people in a liberal capitalist 
society prefer liberty to equality. Thus, a liberal capitalist society seems to support 
the priority rules that emphasize liberty. Like Rawls, a liberal capitalist society 
                                                 
61 Johnston, David. p. 117. See A Theory of Justice, sec 82. 
 38
 
  
62 Strike, Kenneth A. p. 85. 
attaches importance to the basic liberties such as the liberty (freedom) of the 
press, religion, conscience, speech and thought because these liberties can cause 
people to develop ideas that liberal capitalist society supports.  
         Moreover, Rawls includes private property as an important and basic liberty 
and also states that “a basic prerequisite is the compatibility of economic 
arrangements with the institutions of liberty and free association” (272-273). This 
means that he supports the main characteristics of capitalism. Of course, Rawls 
publicly does not support capitalism. Rather, he suggests a revised version of 
capitalism: “a version of the mixed economy - markets plus state intervention 
with public or private ownership.”63 
         Here, the meaning of state intervention is to control economic inequality by 
prevention of monopoly and redistribution of income. This is a form of a welfare 
state. However, a welfare state should be within a capitalist society in order to 
maintain itself because a welfare state needs the abundant material base. 
Otherwise, a welfare state confronts difficulties to maintain and improve a good 
economic situation like some European countries. Thus, if Rawls wants to support 
the idea of a welfare state, he has to admit the structure of capitalism whether he 
supports it or not. In addition, even though Rawls suggests “a property-owning 
democracy involving a widespread distribution of property, it is not clear whether 
such a system is really that different from capitalism.”64 That he only concentrates 
 
    Edinburgh University Press, 2000. p. 167. 
   
                                                 
63 Clark & Gintis. p. 312. 
64 Townshend, Jules. C.B. Macpherson and the Problem of Liberal Democracy. Edinburgh:   
39
on the matter of distribution, not on the economic and social structure or the 
means of production, indicates that Rawls assumes the framework of capitalism 
whether he intends it or not. 
         The problem is that in a capitalist regime the relationship between equality 
and liberty is in severe tension rather than in harmony. For example, the 
continuous accumulation of capital of haves cannot be limited to guarantee 
equality of have-nots. Thus, in a capitalist society economic inequality is taken to 
be inevitable and need not be unjust. Moreover, economic life in the domain of 
capitalism “takes precedence over the blind law of the market, or even the rule of 
economic efficiency.”65 Thus, “the institutions of the mixed economy [as well as 
capitalism] are incompatible with the [equality] principle of justice.”66 Finally, 
under a capitalist regime, equality cannot help but be limited. Thus, unless Rawls 
criticizes capitalism by revision of priority rules, it is difficult to clear suspicion 
that his theory accepts a capitalist framework and therefore limits equality.  
         Let’s consider this point more concretely. Rawls claims that his theory 
follows democratic equality. This claim is supported by his second principle. If, 
like his claim, the second principle is achieved fully, it is possible to secure 
equality. However, unlike Rawls’s claim, the difference principle by priority rules 
remains ideological. In reality, the demand for economic equality is the demand 
of oppressed minorities who cannot participate to create and change the social and 
economic structure. They want to realize their demand such as “redistributing 
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income, improving working conditions, and controlling the investment and 
market system.”67 However, under priority rules, it is very difficult for them to 
persuade a few greater power groups to support social and economic reforms or 
regulations required by the second principle because priority rules guarantee free 
economic activity rather than economic equality. Moreover, since Rawls excludes 
the equality principle in the constitutional stage, there is no device to control and 
restrict economic and social inequality. 
         The only way to resolve economic equality is thus voluntary and free 
transfers of benefits prompted by the ruling class’s moral intuitions. However, 
because people are self-interested and rational according to Rawls’s assumption, 
it is difficult to expect voluntary sacrifice by the ruling class. Moreover, history 
shows that no ruling class is interested in solving problems created by unequal 
structures and that deeper injustices result from ruling economic principles that 
guarantee the interest of the ruling class. Thus, in order to seek a solution to 
economic inequality, the equality principle should be considered with the same 
priority as the liberty principle in the constitutional stage. That is, the equality 
principle as well as the liberty principle should be accepted as independent criteria 
for judging decisions made in the political and economic spheres. However, the 
priority rules consider the liberty principle as the first criterion to decide the 
societal system, thereby destroying the balance between equality and liberty. 
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         Second, priority rules that emphasize liberty only reveal the illusion of 
political equality rather than guarantee it. According to the first priority rule, 
political and legal equality are considered before economic equality, thus 
indicating that people suffering from economic disadvantages can still be 
politically equal to those with greater wealth and power.  
         However, “socialists have responded by claiming that such a belief rests on 
an illusion.”68 I agree with the socialist response. They believe that Rawls’s 
conception of justice and his theory generally do not consider political, social and 
most fundamentally economic realities. In reality, the least advantaged (for 
example, the poor) do not think that legal and political equality have the meaning 
that Rawls claims because they cannot reform the economic inequality only with 
legal and political equality. In ancient Greek city-states, slavery was a necessary 
condition to maintain democracy. That is, the economic base is an important 
condition to preserve the political structure. Moreover, according to socialists 
such as Macpherson, Nielson, Wolff and Clark, “the realities of capitalism, both 
laissez-faire and modern, make impossible the attaining of equal liberty and 
human autonomy.”69 Thus, Rawls’s claim that capitalism can be compatible with 
an equality of self-respect, equal liberty for all, as did most liberal theorists is 
invalid.  
         Thus, without the economic base, it makes no sense talking about political 
equality. That is, political equality without economic equality is illusion. Take, for 
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example, an election. There are two candidates: one is from the working class and 
the other is an employer. Usually, the latter is richer than the former. However, 
for Rawls, both of them have the same political equality, so that they can exercise 
their eligibility for election. Moreover, they have the same basic liberties, that is, 
they have equal liberty. It appears that both candidates have the same condition. 
However, in reality, this is just formal equality. For example, for Rawls, both 
candidates have equal freedom of speech. Formally, this is true. If they want to 
give a speech in public, they can give it within the rules. However, substantively, 
it is false that both have equal liberty. In reality, a rich candidate (employer) can 
have more and better chances to give his/her speech, for example, he/she has 
more opportunity for media advertising because he/she has a better economic 
condition than the worker. Even though a candidate is not elected by economic 
ability, a working class candidate cannot help having difficulty competing. This 
situation can impose a burden on other workers to exercise their eligibility for 
election. That is, if they have ambition to compete in an election (want to enjoy 
their political liberty), they may give up more easily and limit their political 
liberty arbitrarily because of the precedent they have seen. Thus, we can say that 
social and economic structure (circumstances) can limit political liberty as well as 
political equality. As Tawney says, “extreme economic inequalities [and an 
unequal economic system] make liberty an empty word for the masses.”70 The 
emphasis on liberty may not guarantee either liberty or equality. Thus, when 
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political equality and economic equality have to be considered simultaneously, 
political liberty as well as political equality can be realized. 
         The more serious problem is the constitutional process that operates by 
Rawls’s priority principles. Since most people who participate in the 
constitutional process are of the ruling class, liberty may become the privilege of 
the few; “and the ideology of the priority of liberty becomes a device for 
manipulating the mass into an acceptance of their own inferior status and 
exploitation.”71 That is why liberal capitalists and Rawls emphasize basic liberties 
such as the freedom of speech, religion and thought. 
         In addition, as Pogge points out, the priority principle within the second 
principle has some problems. “The second principle imposes two requirements 
upon the social and economic inequalities an institutional scheme may generate: 
the opportunity principle and the difference principle.”72 These are serially 
ordered so that the former ranks lexically above the latter, just as the first 
principle ranks lexically above the second principle as a whole. That is, the 
opportunity principle is prior to the difference principle. However, this order 
cannot solve social and economic inequalities. To have the same opportunity 
without some regulations just means simple and formal equality. For example, 
according to the opportunity principle, all people can enter university if they pass 
the entrance exam. This appears that all people have the same opportunity. But if 
one does not have resources to prepare for the exam, how does one enjoy this 
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opportunity? Thus, if the opportunity principle has to be presupposed as Rawls 
claims, people who have vested rights have a better opportunity of getting 
benefits continuously because they already have resources to exercise 
opportunities. That is, while some people who do not have vested rights try to get 
resources, people who have vested rights enjoy more opportunities. Thus, it is 
difficult to realize even procedural equality with these priority rules. After all, the 
equality principle has difficulty obtaining the desired results that Rawls expects. 
         Thus, Rawls attempts the revision of his principles in Political Liberalism. 
In Political Liberalism, he claims that the tension between equality and liberty 
occurs not by itself but by the arguments ‘for the sake of the highest things’ 
between different religious, philosophical and moral conception of the good as 
well as the conflicts of social and economic interests.73 That is why he seeks an 
overlapping consensus, not to attempt to synthesize the various values or 
substitute one value. Thus, Rawls revises his two principles of justice in Political 
Liberalism. 
         First, he states that he does not explain ‘fair value’ in A Theory of Justice 
fully. For Rawls, ‘fair value’ secures political liberties. “This guarantee means 
that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or 
economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in 
the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to 
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influence the outcome of political decisions.”74 Thus, the priority of liberty does 
not impede the second principle and guarantee equality. However, we cannot say 
that procedural matters can solve the problem of structure. To put it concretely, 
‘fair value’ can guarantee economic equality, but this guarantee is just reached 
within the framework when liberty has the priority. In other words, if economic 
equality conflicts with matters of liberty, economic equality is beyond the scope 
of fair value. Of course, it is possible for the equality principle to be guaranteed in 
the legislative stage. For example, Rawls includes ‘social minimum’ in the 
constitutional stage in Political Liberalism. This shows that Rawls starts to 
consider basic social structure as well as individual aspects in order to achieve 
justice as fairness. However, in reality, even the American constitution does not 
manifest ‘social minimum’ yet. Through this example, we can see that to exclude 
the equality principle from constitutional essentials has very significant symbolic 
and practical meaning.  
         In sum, Rawls’s attempt to revise his principles is not successful in the view 
of economic equality. Of course, it is true that Rawls includes the proper 
explanation to ensure and guarantee procedural equality. However, this cannot 
guarantee that people enjoy equality as much as liberty in his theory. Moreover, 
except the revision of the first principle75, we do not find a significant change. 
The priority between the two principles of justice is still given by the order. That 
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is, this revision76 in Political Liberalism has the same limits as those of A Theory 
of Justice. The two principles by priority rules limit the two values of equality and 
liberty not harmonize them.  
         Indeed, the idea of the lexical priority of the first principle over the second 
and of the opportunity principle over the difference principle is not a proper 
compromise to realize equality and liberty. Rather, this compromise limits the 
realization of either.  
         This result is caused by Rawls’s position.  
         As stated above, Rawls does not concede the egalitarian position. He claims 
that his theory of justice supports democratic equality. Thus, some people 
evaluate that Rawls’s theory can be compatible with socialism and capitalism. 
However, according to socialists, like Macpherson, “Rawls endorses the 
fundamental relations of capitalist market society and its property institutions.”77 
They claim that Rawls fails to understand the possible political consequences of 
modes of production. “It is argued that private ownership of the means of 
production and exchange will undermine first principle and fair equality 
opportunity.” 78 Moreover, they criticize Rawls’s priorities as follows: “correct 
property relations ought to constrain the choice of a constitution and basic 
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liberties rather than vice versa.”79 Other problems raised by the left about Rawls’s 
treatment of economic life center around his failure to analyze production itself. 
“Rawls says almost nothing about the organization and control of the production 
process.”80 Thus, it is not true that Rawls’s theory is compatible with socialism. 
Macpherson maintains that “Rawls has a model of a just society which is 
essentially that of the liberal-democratic capitalist welfare state.”81 
          In fact, his priority rule that emphasizes the values of liberty ensures “a 
primary validity for the liberal version.”82 The equal citizenship rights defined by 
Rawls’s first principle of justice are in fact identical with the civil liberties and 
political rights characteristic of western capitalist democracy (61). Consequently, 
“he supports, in the second part of [A Theory of Justice], which deals with 
institutions, the typical American liberal balance – constitutional democracy and a 
free economy.”83 There is much evidence that Rawls supports the liberal 
perspective. 
         First, as stated above several times, Rawls follows the assumption of liberal 
capitalism: people are rational and self-interested. Second, when he creates the 
principles of justice, he divides justice into political and economic spheres. This is 
the evidence to support capitalism because “capitalism is consistent with the 
principle of equal liberties only if the separation of political and economic spheres 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Macpherson, C.B. Democratic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. p. 88.  
82 Charvet, John. p. 111. 
 48
 
  
83 Merquior, J.G. p. 139. 
of social life can be sustained.”84 Rawls also seems to distinguish between the 
private and public spheres because he focuses only on liberties in the private 
sphere. This distinction is exactly what liberals maintain. When liberal capitalists 
accepted democracy, they were afraid that some basic liberties would be 
abolished by the political decision that all people can participate. Thus, they 
accept only the democratic process without considering its structural question of 
who are the subjects of democracy. In fact, Rawls also explores procedural justice 
rather than structural matters of a society. This shows that he already accepts a 
social system and as claimed above, the system is within the framework of liberal 
capitalism. In addition, the reason that Rawls considers the constitution as 
important in the process of two principles of justice is that “the viability of liberal 
democratic societies is contingent upon the sustained and widespread legitimate 
[grounds] of their basic institutions.”85  
         However, libertarians criticize that Rawls’s idea restricts the value of 
liberty. First, the list of basic liberties appears too narrow to the libertarians. 
Second and more a serious critique, their objection to Rawls is that his principles 
for the distribution of economic goods stress the value of equality at the expense 
of other values and rights, especially the value of economic freedom and the right 
to property. Even though “Rawls’s claim that an unequal distribution of economic 
goods is justified only if it is to the advantage of society’s worst-off individuals, it 
is insufficient for the libertarian as a ground of rights and freedom, which others 
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imply have no right to abridge or infringe upon”86 because Libertarians, for 
example Nozick, regard the rights as fundamental or basic. For Nozick, “there are 
no justified sacrifices of some of us for others.”87 Thus, Nozick locates his theory 
in the center of individuals’ rights resulting in autonomy and individuality of 
persons being considered above of all. “Consequently, [there is nothing] that 
could be held to infringe anyone’s liberty.”88 Nozick argues that Rawls’s theory 
does not fully respect the autonomy and individuality of persons. 
         In fact, Rawls does not completely agree with the libertarian perspective. He 
does not claim that only liberty has the absolute value. Rather, he proposes the 
equality principle in order to harmonize equality and liberty. This shows that 
Rawls is not a libertarian because libertarians do not believe equality can be 
compatible with liberty. Yet, at least, Rawls agrees with the importance of liberty 
even though the degree of emphasis on liberty differs from libertarians. His 
priority rules certainly guarantee the liberty principle as priority. Even though 
Rawls is not a libertarian, we can see that he supports the basic principles of 
liberal democracy. As a result, Rawls attempts to reconcile between liberty and 
equality within the framework of liberalism. 
         However, as discussed above, balancing equality and liberty cannot be done 
within a liberals’ view. Liberals do not have the intention to harmonize between 
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equality and liberty because the most important value for them is liberty. That is, 
the demand for balancing between them is beyond the liberal framework. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
         This thesis starts from agreeing with Rawls’s acknowledgement that the 
crisis of current society causes the tension between equality and liberty. To solve 
the tension, I study the principles of justice that Rawls suggests. As Charvet 
states, “the way in which Rawls seeks to deduce these principles of justice is 
through the idea of contract in which self-interested persons choose principles of 
justice.”89 The principles of justice derived from the original position imply 
interests and status of equal and free persons. Thus, Rawls’s principles represent 
equality and liberty respectively. Rawls maintains that his perspective is 
egalitarian liberalism because his two principles of justice deal with equality and 
liberty together.  
         After addressing each principle, Rawls proposes a priority rule as the 
criterion to set up the relationship between the two principles. That is, his liberty 
principle and equality principle are arranged based on a priority rule: the priority 
of liberty over equality. According to Rawls, this compromise can reconcile the 
tension between equality and liberty.  
         However, his compromise by priority rules is not proper to harmonize 
between them. By choosing the priority rule, the emphasis on liberty strengthens 
the value of liberty while weakening the value of equality. This means that 
Rawls’s compromise fails to satisfy both values. More concretely, according to 
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the priority rule, under the condition of equal liberty and fair opportunity, the 
difference principle in which the least advantaged get the greatest benefit, is 
applied. Thus, he restricts fair distribution of wealth, income and power as a 
secondary matter. The distribution of wealth, income and power can be realized 
only when a citizen’s liberty and fair opportunity are presupposed. That is, Rawls 
argues that the problem of social inequality by wealth and power never surpasses 
the problem of liberty. This is the same compromise between equality and liberty 
that liberalism attempts. Thus, the difference principle that can solve the 
inequality cannot be applied and have an effect on society, unlike Rawls’s 
expectation. Finally, even though he tries to create a proper compromise, he 
remains within the liberal tradition. 
         As stated above, in liberalism’s framework, it is not possible to find the way 
to compromise between equality and liberty. Liberalism regards the relationship 
between equality and liberty as a conflict relationship, so that we have to choose 
between them. However, as discussed above, “it is not to be assumed that these 
are necessarily competing categories”90 because they belong to the same category 
as moral conceptions. In other words, they have the same ultimate purpose of 
improving people’s lives. Therefore, they should have a supportive relationship. 
As a result, we do not need to choose which value has priority. Rather, both 
values demand to be reunited and reconciled because they can be guaranteed 
when they are together achieved. Of course, this does not mean that equality and 
                                                 
 53
 
  
90 Rees, John. p. 92. 
liberty increase together without limit. In reality, they can conflict with each 
other. The compromise that I claim, thus, is to reconcile between equality and 
liberty in order to care about improving the quality of people’s lives. Under this 
purpose, we continue to seek a balance that can satisfy the values of equality and 
liberty.  
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